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Abstract
This paper provides a theory of nancial frictions as a transmission mechanism for prim-
itive shocks to translate into aggregate TFP uctuations. In our model, nancial frictions
distort existing capital allocation across di¤erent production units, rather than investment
in new capital. News shocks on future technology improvement are introduced as a device
to identify TFP uctuations originating from this mechanism. Our simulation shows that
variations in nancial frictions in response to news shocks can generate sizable uctuations
in aggregate TFP and, thus, business cycles before the actual technology change is realized.
Using a combined dataset from Compustat and IBES, we nd that the empirical responses
of capital acquisition to prospects about future protability are signicantly larger for rms
more likely to be nancially constrained, while such a pattern does not exist for new capital
investment. Furthermore, capital acquisition of constrained rms is found to be more pro-
cyclical than that for unconstrained ones. Our evidence thus provides strong support for
the importance of nancial frictions on capital allocation as the transmission mechanism
proposed by our theory.
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1 Introduction
Macroeconomists have long searched for factors behind aggregate Total Factor Productivity
(TFP). In particular, a theory of TFP uctuations has been called for, due to their key role
in business cycles.1 One promising candidate for understanding TFP uctuations is nancial
friction on inputs. The presence of such friction naturally distorts resource allocation and,
thus, reduces aggregate productive e¢ ciency. In fact, the business cycle literature has long
emphasized the distortion by nancial frictions on new capital investment. Recent evidence,
however, points to a di¤erent channel for nancial frictions to a¤ect resource allocation: dis-
torting existing capital allocation across rms. For example, Harford (2005) has shown that
variations in nancial frictions are crucial for capital reallocation through mergers and ac-
quisitions. Reallocation at the disaggregate level, furthermore, has been found to play a key
role in explaining U.S. aggregate productivity uctuations over business cycles (e.g., Basu and
Fernald, 2001). Taken together, these observations indicate that variations in nancial fric-
tions, by reallocating capital at the disaggregate level, might be important as a transmission
mechanism for primitive shocks to translate into aggregate TFP uctuations.
This paper formalizes the above idea from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. We
rst construct a model in which nancial frictions a¤ect aggregate productive e¢ ciency via
capital allocation across di¤erent production units (projects). We then introduce news shocks
on future technological improvement as a device to identify aggregate TFP uctuations orig-
inating from variations in nancial frictions. These shocks are, by construction, uncorrelated
to the current production technology, but, at the same time, they a¤ect nancial frictions
through future protability. Accordingly, the adoption of news shocks allows us to isolate
and identify at rm level variations in credit conditions that are uncorrelated with changes in
current technology, a prerequisite to test the roles of nancial frictions later in the paper using
rm-level data. Our theory shows that endogenous variations of nancial frictions in response
to such primitive shocks can trigger aggregate TFP uctuations and business cycles through
reallocating capital.
The key ingredient of our model is asymmetric nancing constraint across projects. In our
1For example, Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007) suggest that uctuations in aggregate TFP account for
most of the post-war business cycle uctuations. They even claim that a fall in TFP is key in explaining the
output decline during the Great Depression. Cole and Ohanian (1999) reach similar conclusions, arguing that
a sharp decline in TFP is key to explain the output drop during the Great Depression. Also, Arias, Hansen
and Ohanian (2007) claim that a decline in the volatility of TFP can successfully account for the decline in the
cyclical volatility of output and its components since 1983.
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economy, there are two types of projects: One is subject to a binding nancial constraint on
the project scale due to limited enforcement of debt payment by entrepreneurs, and the other
is not. Given the non-default of the debt contract, debt, and thus, the production scale of a
constrained project are limited to a fraction of the future contract value for the entrepreneur.
The asymmetry of nancial constraints implies a gap of marginal product of capital across
di¤erent types of projects, which creates a potential e¢ ciency gain of reallocating capital from
unconstrained to constrained projects.
As a result, any primitive shock that a¤ects the future contract value may help to trig-
ger aggregate TFP uctuations through variations in nancial frictions. Candidates for such
shocks include news shocks on future technological improvement. Specically, the arrival of
good news causes an immediate jump in the value of the contract by increasing future prof-
itability of the constrained projects. Entrepreneurs, therefore, have less incentive to default
on the debt payment. This weakens the nancial constraint and induces capital to ow to
constrained projects. The e¢ ciency gain arising from capital reallocation shows up in the
aggregate economy as an upward shift to current aggregate TFP, and leads to business cycles
by allowing positive comovement among current output, consumption, investment, and hours
worked.2
To evaluate the quantitative implications of our model, we calibrate the economy to the
U.S. data. Simulation results indicate that our proposed transmission mechanism of TFP
uctuations can be quantitatively important. In particular, the magnitude of the increase in
TFP on impact to a positive news shock, which is purely driven by a reallocation of capital,
is about one third of the increase in TFP when technology improvement is materialized. Such
a magnitude is in line with the impulse response of TFP to innovations to stock prices, as
documented by Beaudry and Portier (2006). Moreover, business cycle moments of the economy
are close to those in the U.S. data. This suggests that our model can replicate the U.S. business
cycles reasonably well.
Our theory delivers the following two testable implications regarding our proposed trans-
mission mechanism. First, nancial frictions on capital allocations are countercyclical. In
other words, we should expect that during an economic expansion (recession), nancially con-
strained rms acquire more (less) capital than unconstrained ones. Second, rm-level variations
in expected future protability a¤ect capital reallocation for nancially constrained rms. By
contrast, there is no such e¤ect for unconstrained rms. In our model, the rst implication
2Throughout this paper, we explore the e¤ects of positive news shocks on TFP to illustrate the role of
nancial frictions as a transmission mechanism. Our proposed mechanism, however, can also be applied to the
TFP dynamics during an economic downturn.
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provides a channel for nancial frictions on capital allocation to a¤ect aggregate TFP at the
business cycle frequency, while the second serves as the underlying mechanism for news shocks
to a¤ect capital reallocation and, thus, as the micro-foundation for the countercyclicality of
frictions on capital allocation.
We use a combined data set from Compustat and IBES to test the above two implications.
We rst classify rms into quintiles according to the likelihood of being nancial constrained,
using the method of Kaplan and Zingales (1997). We nd that rms in the top quintiles
acquire more capital in boom than those in the bottom quintiles do, while the opposite is true
for recession. We then use analyst earnings forecast as a proxy for individual rmsprospects
for future protability. Our panel regression shows that the elasticity of capital acquisition to
earnings forecast is monotonically increasing in the likelihood of being nancial constrained.
Our empirical results therefore strongly support both implications and, therefore, our theory.
Finally, we examine the empirical relevance of a competing channel for business prospects
to a¤ect rmsproduction scale and, thus, business cycles: nancial frictions on new capital
investment. This channel has been widely adopted in the literature to explain business cycle
propagation.3 We nd that the estimated elasticities of investment to earnings forecast are
very similar in magnitude across quintiles, suggesting that variations in nancial frictions are
not likely to be important in investment uctuations over the business cycles. This, together
with our empirical ndings for capital acquisition, indicates a more empirically plausible role
of nancial frictions on capital allocation as a transmission mechanism for aggregate TFP
uctuations.
Our model is closely related to Jermann and Quadrini (2007). They argue that in an econ-
omy with nancial frictions due to limited enforcement of debt repayment, the mere prospect
of high future productivity growth can generate sizable gains in labor productivity through re-
source reallocation. In their model, however, nancial frictions are imposed on the investment
of new capital goods. Like other models focusing on frictions distorting saving-investment de-
cisions (referred to as investment wedge), variations in such frictions in response to primitive
shocks cannot a¤ect productive e¢ ciency on impact. Moreover, a relaxation of the nancial
constraint induces capital and labor to shift from the consumption good to the investment
good sector, implying that consumption and investment comove negatively.4 In our model, by
3See, among others, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1998) and Cooley, Mari-
mon and Quadrini (2004).
4The negative correlation between consumption and investment is also present in other existing studies.
Beaudry and Portier (2007) have proved that in a two-sector model with constant returns to scale for production,
an increase in investment is necessarily associated with a decrease in consumption or hours worked or both. We
extended the proof to two-sector models with decreasing returns to scale in one sector or both and nancial
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contrast, relaxing the nancial constraint can trigger an immediate expansion of TFP by real-
locating existing resources. This makes the positive comovement of macro aggregates feasible.
This paper contributes to the literature on nancial frictions. It has long been argued that
frictions in nancial markets are important for business cycles. For example, Bernanke and
Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and many other studies show that the presence of
nancial frictions adds persistence or volatility to aggregate uctuations over business cycles.5
More recently, researchers started to pay attention to the role of improving nancial markets
on Great Moderation (see, for example, Jermann and Quadrini, 2006). Despite this widely ac-
cepted view on the importance of nancial frictions, their e¤ects through distorting investment
have been recently found to play quantitatively minor roles in driving economic uctuations.6
Our paper provides a new insight into the role of nancial frictions over business cycles. To
our knowledge, we are the rst to show, both theoretically and empirically, that nancial fric-
tions on capital allocation, instead of new capital investment, may serve as a key transmission
mechanism for primitive shocks to translate into aggregate TFP uctuations.
Moreover, our work contributes to the literature on the empirical relationship between
resource reallocation and aggregate productivity uctuations. Basu and Fernald (2000) nd
that resource reallocation plays a key role in aggregate productivity uctuations over business
cycles. One channel for resource reallocation to a¤ect aggregate productivity is through the
countercyclical frictions on capital reallocation. For example, Maksimovic and Philips (2001)
nd that less productive rms tend to be sold as prospects of the aggregate economy improve.
Correspondingly, aggregate output and the productivity dispersion across rms are found to be
negatively correlated (Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2006).7 Harford (2005) provides further evidence
that the observed correlation between economic expansion and merger waves is essentially
driven by an increase in macro-level capital liquidity and a reduction in the degree of nancial
frictions correlated with stock market valuation. Consistent with Harfords ndings, our em-
pirical results may shed light on the countercyclicality of frictions on capital reallocation: A
brighter prospect in booms allows nancially constrained rms to acquire more capital than
unconstrained rms, thus helping to reduce the gap of marginal product of capital across rms.
This paper is related to the literature on credit or liquidity shocks. Although such shocks
are often adopted as primitive shocks in theoretical work (e.g., Jermann and Quadrini, 2006 and
frictions on the investment good sector (e.g., Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). See Section 5.3.2 for the proof.
5See Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) for an excellent review of this literature.
6For example, business cycle accounting by Chari et al. (2007) suggests that frictions that show up as the
investment wedge play, at best, a tertiary role in the Great Depression and the 1982 recession.
7Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) found that the correlation of productivity dispersion with output is around
-0.4. This negative correlation is robust to adjustment of capital utilization. Consistent with the empirical
nding, the nancial friction in our model implies countercyclical benets for capital reallocation.
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Aghion, Angeletos, Banerjee and Manova, 2007), two problems occur when theory confronts
data. First, the endogeneity makes it di¢ cult to isolate variations in credit conditions that
are exogenous to shocks to current productivity.8 Second, idiosyncratic credit shocks (i.e.,
tightening or relaxing credit constraint) at the rm level are hard to identify or measure.
Our paper shows that the use of news shocks provides a way of overcoming the above two
problems. Theoretically, the adoption of news shocks avoids the endogeneity issue, because
our theory indicates that news shocks may cause variations in nancial frictions, while they
are uncorrelated to current technology. Empirically, such news shocks can be proxied by
individual rmsearnings forecasts. This allows us to test at the disaggregate level our proposed
transmission mechanism through which idiosyncratic credit frictions a¤ect capital allocation.
Our paper also contributes to the recent discussion on the role of news shocks in triggering
business cycles. Beaudry and Portier (2007) present a wide class of business cycle models
in which mere changes in expectation about future productivity cannot generate comovement
among consumption, investment and hours worked.9 The reason is essentially the same as that
discussed above: Without current expansion of TFP, consumption and investment will always
comove negatively if they replace one to one with each other. Den Haan and Kaltenbrunner
(2006) provide another example. In that paper, although labor hoarding may translate into
additional resources for economic expansion when there are matching frictions in labor mar-
ket, the initial responses of consumption and investment move in opposite directions.10 One
potential source of the observed TFP changes in response to news shocks is variations in cap-
ital utilization. However, in the standard setup with convex investment adjustment costs, an
investment boom must be associated with an increase in marginal q, which actually implies a
decline in capital utilization.11 By contrast, our work shows explicitly how news shocks are
transmitted through nancial frictions at the disaggregate level into aggregate TFP uctua-
tions. In particular, both of our theoretical and empirical ndings suggest that variations in
nancial frictions can be considered as a potential transmission mechanism for news shocks to
drive business cycles, as claimed by Beaudry and Portier (2006).
Finally, this paper is related to a growing literature on frictions on resource allocation as
8For example, Eisfeldt (2004) argues that market liquidity varies with productivity shocks. In addition,
Eisfelt and Rampini (2006) show in a standard business cycle model that current TFP shocks a¤ect frictions in
capital allocation.
9Beaudry and Portier (2004) and Danthine, Donaldson and Johnsen (1998) reached similar conclusions.
10 In addition, Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2006) nd that it is hard to generate expectation-driven
business cycles without nominal frictions and monetary targeting.
11This holds even if there is an expected investment-good-specic technological improvement. Using ow
investment adjustment costs, therefore, becomes the key for capital utilization to increase in a boom period (see
Jaimovich and Rebelo, 2006).
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the source of TFP (e.g., Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008; Barseghyan and Dicecio, 2006; and
Erosa and Cabrillana, 2007). Much of the literature emphasizes the role of frictions in the
cross-country di¤erence of long-run TFP and, therefore, abstracts from the dynamics of such
frictions. Recently, Buera and Shin (2008) show the persistent e¤ect of nancial frictions on
economic development via resource allocation. Our paper instead explores its role for TFP
uctuations over business cycles.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we illustrate, in a simple model without
labor, that nancial frictions on capital allocation may act as a transmission mechanism of TFP
uctuations. We then extend the economy to incorporate more features of business cycles in
Section 3. Section 4 provides a discussion of the calibration procedure. In Section 5, we report
the impulse responses and business cycle statistics, and we check the robustness of our model to
alternative parameter values. Using rm-level data, Section 6 tests the transmission mechanism
in our model for news shocks to a¤ect aggregate productivity via capital reallocation. Section
7 concludes. The appendix contains the denition for recursive competitive equilibrium and
the derivation of the enforcement constraint.
2 A model without labor
In this section, we describe a model that abstracts from labor as input into production (referred
to as economy without labor) to highlight the role of nancial frictions on capital allocation
as a transmission mechanism of aggregate TFP uctuations.12 A full-blown model with richer
business cycle ingredients will be provided in the following section.
Consider an economy with a representative household and a continuum of entrepreneurs
with unit mass. The representative household owns physical capital and decides how much to
consume and how much to invest in capital. In addition, the representative household owns
the entitlement and, therefore, the prot from a continuum of projects. Entrepreneurs have
access to the technology of operating projects. Each entrepreneur can operate only one project.
Entrepreneurs decide how much capital to rent from the representative household for prot
maximization.13
Projects are classied into two categories, according to whether working capital (or liquid
fund) is needed for production. Specically, a fraction  of projects, denoted as type-h projects,
12Alternatively, this model can be interpreted as one in which labor is a xed factor in production and is
supplied inelastically.
13By assuming rental markets as the avenue to allocate existing capital, we abstract from the issue of rm
dynamics in the context of business cycles. Such an abstraction, however, will not a¤ect the qualitative feature
of our model. As we will show later, the key determinant of aggregate TFP is the distribution of capital across
di¤erent projects.
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require working capital before production takes place. We assume that the size of the working
capital required, denoted as D
 
Kht

, increases with the size of the capital deployed in a type-h
project, denoted as Kht . For the remaining 1    fraction of projects, referred to as type-l
projects, working capital is not necessary.14
Entrepreneurs retain the ability to operate the project with probability . Once she loses
this ability, the entrepreneur exits the market with no cost, and there will be a new entrepreneur
entering the market and starting with the same type of project as her predecessor. This
assumption, together with the law of large numbers, enables the fraction of each type of
projects to be constant over time.
2.1 Project Financing and the Entrepreneurs Problem
Type-h projects are nanced through optimal contracts with limited enforceability à la Jer-
mann and Quadrini (2006). To nance working capital, entrepreneurs of type-h projects
borrow from an outside lender at the beginning of each period and repay the debt at the end
of the period, after all transactions are completed.15 ;16 As an intra-period loan, it has a zero
net interest payment. The ability to borrow, however, is bounded by the limited enforcement of
the debt repayment. At the end of the period, the entrepreneur has the ability to divert work-
ing capital. Once the entrepreneur defaults, the lender can take over the control right of the
project from the entrepreneur and recover a fraction ' (< 1) of the future project value. The
entrepreneur and the lender can then renegotiate repayment of the debt. Section 8.1 of the ap-
pendix describes the renegotiation process in detail and shows that the incentive-compatibility
condition imposes the following nancial constraint
D

Kht

 V ht+1 = Et
1X
j=1
^
j
ht+j ; (1)
where V ht+1 is the value of a type-h project to the entrepreneur at the end of period t:
17 ^  
is the e¤ective discount factor and  is the subjective discount factor: ht+j is the one-period
prot of a type-h project at period t + j: (1) implies that the entrepreneur can borrow up to
14Assuming that working capital is also required for type-l projects does not a¤ect our qualitative results, so
long as the degree of nancial constraint is di¤erent across di¤erent types of projects.
15The assumption for entrepreneurs to borrow working capital each period can be rationalized by the fact
that because entrepreneurs become tempted to use excess internal funds ine¢ ciently, it is costly for rms to
retain operating cash ows (see Jensen, 1986). We extend the model to allow internal liquid asset accumulation,
which could be used to partially nance working capital. Our results below are robust to this extension. Details
are available upon request.
16One example of such outside lenders can be a nancial intermediary issuing production loans each period.
17Our implicit assumption here is that if the entrepreneur chose to default, the working capital would be
diverted to the owner of the projects (e.g., the representative household).
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the amount that he can pledge to the lender, which is a fraction  of the future project value.18
The production technology of a type-i, i 2 fh; lg, is given by
Y it = Zt
 
Kit

; (2)
where Kit is capital in a single type-i project. Zt is the aggregate technology, which follows a
stochastic process, as will be described later.
At each period, the entrepreneur of a type-h project chooses capital Kht for prot maxi-
mization.
max
Kht
Zt

Kht
   (rt + )Kht ; (3)
subject to (1) : It should be noted that the entrepreneurs problem can be alternatively spec-
ied as maximizing the present discounted project prot subject to the sequence of nancial
constraints (1) ; by choosing the whole path of capital. The assumption of the rental market for
capital, however, makes the choice of capital at each period independent of previous choices.
Therefore, the dynamic problem boils down to the sequence of one-period prot-maximization
problems, as stated in (3) :19
The problem of an entrepreneur of a type-l project is
max
Klt
Zt

K lt
   (rt + )K lt: (4)
The rst-order condition delivers the standard demand equation of capital
K lt =

Zt
rt + 
 1
1 
: (5)
We measure the degree of frictions on capital allocation as the gap of marginal product to
capital (MPK henceforth) between two types of projects.
MPKht
MPK lt
=

Kht
K lt
 1
(6)
In this simple model, such frictions originate from the presence of nancial constraint on
type h projects. Accordingly, tightening (or relaxing) the nancial constraint leads to an
increase (or decrease) in the gap of MPK and, therefore, frictions on capital reallocation.
A more general but reduced-form approach to modeling frictions on reallocating capital is to
assume a quadratic cost of reallocating capital. To obtain countercyclicality of such frictions as
18Section 8.1 of the appendix shows that  is positively related to the bargaining power of the lender and the
fraction of project value that is recoverable by the lender.
19The proof is available upon request.
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observed, one might assume that the magnitude of the adjustment cost parameter is negatively
correlated with future protability (see Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2006). Our model can be seen
as providing a micro-foundation for frictions on reallocation capital and its countercyclicality,
which will be shown below.20
2.2 Aggregate TFP and Primitive Shocks
In standard Real Business Cycle (RBC henceforth) models, current technological shocks, by
construction, are the only source for aggregate TFP uctuations. Instead, our purpose here is
to show that nancial frictions, by distorting capital allocation, serve as a source of aggregate
TFP uctuations. To this end, we decompose the aggregate TFP and its uctuations to shed
light on their potential sources in our economy.
We measure the aggregate TFP as the Solow Residual.In our economy, aggregate output
can be expressed as
Yt = Zt

Kht

+ (1  )Zt

K lt

= TFPtK

t
where
TFPt =
Zt
 
Kht

+ (1  )Zt
 
K lt

Kt
Accordingly, the percentage deviation of aggregate TFP from its steady-state value can be
expressed as
4 log TFPt = 4 log

Zt

Kht
Kt

+ (1  )Zt

K lt
Kt

(7)
Note that the right-hand-side (RHShenceforth) of (7) can be further decomposed as
4 log

Zt

Kht
Kt

+ (1  )Zt

K lt
Kt

= 4 log

Zt

Kht
Kt

+ (1  )Zt

K lt
Kt

jKit
Kt
=K
i
K| {z }
the technological e¤ect
+4 log

Zt

Kht
Kt

+ (1  )Zt

K lt
Kt

jZt=Z| {z }
the reallocation e¤ect
+cross product terms (8)
20Other frictions for capital reallocation include managerial incentive to relinquish the control of productive
assets when types of managers are private information (see Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2008a).
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Steady-state values are marked by upper bars. The rst argument on the RHS of (8), called
the technological e¤ect,captures the e¤ect of exogenous technological shifts on the aggregate
TFP, given the distribution of capital as in the steady state. The second argument, referred
to as the reallocation e¤ect, captures the e¤ect of changes in the distribution of capital
across di¤erent types of projects, given the technology as in the steady state. In this simple
economy, the rst-best allocation involves an equal amount of capital allocated across projects.
Introducing nancial frictions may lead to ine¢ cient capital allocation and, hence, reduce
aggregate productive e¢ ciency.
Our purpose is to isolate TFP uctuations caused by the reallocation e¤ect, which in our
model originates from the presence of nancial frictions. To this end, we would like to intro-
duce primitive shocks that help to trigger capital reallocation, but bear no contemporaneous
technological e¤ect. Note that in our model, any primitive shock a¤ecting future protability
of the constrained projects may help to trigger a reallocation of capital by changing the future
contract value. One candidate for such shocks is a news shock on future technological change.21
Specically, we assume that the aggregate technology Zt follows
logZt+1 = (1  ) log Z +  logZt + Zt ; (9)
where Zt denotes innovations regarding information on the next-period aggregate technology
Zt+1. The process (9) is di¤erent from the stochastic technology process in standard RBC
models: Information on Zt+1 arrives at time t; before Zt+1 is realized. As a result, next-
period aggregate technology becomes perfectly predictable. Note that the news shock Zt is
orthogonal to the current technology Zt and, hence, cannot a¤ect the aggregate TFP via
the technological e¤ect. Instead, such a news shock leads to variations in nancial frictions by
changing the value of a type-h project, as it contains information about future technology. The
revaluation of nancially constrained projects triggers a reallocation of capital. Consequently,
the reallocation e¤ect is the only source of TFP uctuations before actual technology shift is
realized.
2.3 Household
The representative household solves the following problem
max
fCt;Kt+1g1t=0
E0
" 1X
t=0
t
C1 t   1
1  
#
;
21Another candidate for primitive shocks that will obtain qualitatively similar results is an asset pricing shock
arising from the assumption that the entrepreneurial survival probability is itself stochastic.
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subject to
Ct + It = rtKt + (1  )lt + ht : (10)
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + It; (11)
We thus obtain the standard Euler equation.
c t = Et

c t+1 (1 + rt+1)

: (12)
2.4 Timing and Information
The events within each period proceed as follows. At the beginning of each period, news
regarding future technological opportunity arrives. Meanwhile, the previous-period news on
the current-period technology is materialized. Then, the stand-in household supplies capital
to entrepreneurs. After production takes place, the household receives factor payments and
prots, and makes consumption-saving choices. Finally, uncertainty about entrepreneurial
survival is revealed.
2.5 Calibration
We proceed to calibrate the model.22 One period in our model corresponds to one calendar
year, the frequency adopted by Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) in their measurement of the
magnitude of capital reallocation. Consistent with their measurement, we calculate the size of
aggregate capital reallocation in our model by
K^t 

Kht  Kht 1 KtKt 1 + (1  ) K lt  K lt 1 KtKt 1 
Kt
:
Note that K^t measures the sum of changes of capital position for individual projects net of
new capital investment, as the previous period capital stocks in each project are adjusted by
changes in the aggregate capital stock. To obtain a quantitative assessment of the model, we
parameterize D
 
Kht

as follows:
D

Kht

=

Kht

; (13)
where  2 [0; 1], which can be interpreted as the elasticity of working capital required with
respect to the scale of physical capital. In the following calibration,  is a key parameter
targeting the size of capital reallocation over business cycles.
22A formal denition of the competitive equilibrium in a more general model is provided in the next section.
The numerical strategy adopts the standard recursive method.
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We set  = 1; which corresponds to the case of logarithmic utility.  is set to be 0:4 to
map into a capital income share of 0.4. Also, we set  = 0:1; as in the literature.  = 0:96
such that a steady state real interest rate is 4 percent. We let the entrepreneurial survival
probability  be 0.90, which is broadly consistent with the rm survival probability in U.S.
data for manufacturing and business service sectors, as reported by OECD (2001).
For parameters governing the technology process, we set  = 0:95 to match a quarterly
persistence of 0.987. The standard deviation of innovation Z is set equal to 1:26 percent such
that the standard deviation of the H-P ltered log TFP simulated from the model is equal to
the corresponding value from annual U.S. data.
Finally, ,  and  are chosen to match two relevant observations. First, we target a
value of 2 for the ratio of marginal productivity of capital between 75th- and 25th-percentile
projects.23 The second target is an average size of capital reallocation of 1:4 percent, the ratio
of acquisitions plus sales of PP&E over assets for a panel of Compustat rms, as estimated by
Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006). We choose  = 0:5,  = 0:197 to match the rst observation,
and  = 0:40 to match the second.  = 0:5 is in line with the results of Kaplan and Zingales
(1997), who found that about 45 percent of the rms in their sample were likely to be nancially
constrained.24 Moreover, as shall be shown in Section 5.3.1, our quantitative results are robust
to di¤erent parameterization of . Table 1 summarizes parameter values for this economy.
Table 1. Parameterized Values for Economy w/o Labor
Symbol Denition Value
Technology
 Capital share in production function 0.40
 Entrepreneurial survival rate 0.90
 Depreciation rate for capital 0.10
 Elasticity of working capital required 0.40
 Autocorrelation coe¢ cient 0.95
Z Standard deviation of information innovation 0.013
Preference
 Discount factor in utility function 0.96
 Coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion 1
Market
 Default parameter 0.197
 Fraction of type-h projects 0.50
23As we will show in the next section, in our full-blown economy, the ratio of marginal productivity of
capital between two types of projects are equal to the ratio of labor productivity, which we target to match the
corresponding U.S. data.
24More specically, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) develop a criterion to classify rms into groups in terms
of likelihood of being nancially constraint. They nd that among a sample of 49 rms, 19 rms are never
nancially constrained over the entire sample period, 8 rms are possibly nancially constrained at some time,
and 22 rms are likely nancially constrained at some time.
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2.6 Impulse Response to News on Zt
To illustrate the role of nancial frictions as a transmission mechanism of TFP uctuations,
we explore the impulse responses of various macro aggregates to news shocks. We consider the
following experiment: At period 0, the economy is at steady state. At the beginning of period
1, all agents receive unanticipated news that the aggregate technology Z will increase by one
percent in period 2. At the beginning of period 2, the technology improvement is materialized.
Our choice of one period as the lag for technological changes to be realized is motivated by
Beaudry and Portier (2006).25
Figure 1 plots the impulse response of capital reallocation and nancial ctions of allocating
capital, measured by the ratio of marginal productivity of capital between two types of projects.
We see from Panel A that in response to the news shock, the gap of marginal product of
capital decreases by about 3 percent and stays below the steady-state level throughout the
boom period. This suggests that consistent with the empirical evidence, nancial frictions
in our model are countercyclical. Accordingly, when good news arrives, capital is reallocated
from type-l to type-h projects. Panel B shows that the magnitude of capital reallocation on
impact is about 2 percent of capital stock, a number that is reasonable according to sizes of
capital reallocation reported by Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006).
[Insert Figure 1]
The e¢ ciency gain on impact shows up as an increase in the aggregate TFP. This is evident
from Figure 2, which illustrates the dynamics of aggregate TFP and its components following
the news shock. Most importantly, the reallocation e¤ect explains all of the increase in the
aggregate TFP upon the arrival of the good news, reecting the fact that, in our experiment,
nancial frictions on capital allocation are the only channel for triggering aggregate TFP
uctuations. After realization of the technology improvement, the technological e¤ect starts
to play a role, and the contribution of the reallocation e¤ect to the aggregate TFP declines
gradually. It is also noted that the gap of MPK reverts slowly to the steady state, showing
that the e¤ects of variations in nancial frictions are persistent (Figure 1). The resulting
persistent reallocation e¤ect amplies TFP uctuations at period 2 and afterwards, as shown
in Figure 2.
25The evidence in Beaudry and Portier (2006) suggests that a permanent change in TFP may be associated
with a up to 10 quarters long period during which there may be no actual change in technological opportunities.
The results remain qualitatively the same if we assume that an anticipated shock is realized at period 3.
Our choice of one year as the lag for actual technological improvement to be materialized greatly eases the
computation burden to solve for policy functions.
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[Insert Figure 2]
The increase of aggregate TFP makes the comovement of macro aggregates feasible. Figure
3 plots the impulse responses of macroeconomic variables. Although the contemporaneous
technology remains unchanged, the arrival of good news generates an economic expansion
immediately: consumption, investment and output all increase on impact.26 In other words,
our model is capable of generating business cycles by establishing a source of TFP uctuations.
[Insert Figure 3]
In summary, we show, in a simple model, the role of nancial frictions as a transmission
mechanism of TFP uctuations through capital allocation: Endogenous variations of nancial
frictions in response to good news shocks can trigger a reallocation of capital; the redistribution
of capital creates an e¢ ciency gain as an increase of aggregate TFP. The increase in TFP allows
macro aggregates to comove positively before the actual technology improvement is realized.27
3 A Full-Blown Model
The basic model of Section 2 has a number of limitations. By implicitly treating labor as
a xed factor, the production technology (2) implies a time-invariant labor allocation across
projects. Prohibiting labor reallocation does not seem reasonable, given the importance of job
creation and job destruction for U.S. business cycles.28 Moreover, the basic model is silent on
the impulse response of labor supply and, hence, unable to address the issue of uctuations in
aggregate employment.
This section extends the basic model to overcome these limitations. There are two ma-
jor changes. First, nancial frictions are imposed on allocation of both capital and labor.
Accordingly, labor will be reallocated along with capital following variations in nancial fric-
tions. Second, endogenous labor supply is introduced. In addition, we incorporate the following
ingredients: investment adjustment costs; trend growth in technology and population; and het-
erogeneity in productive e¢ ciency across di¤erent types of projects. We show that the main
results of Section 2 are robust to these changes when the extended model (referred to as the
26The response of investment on impact is arguably small. We shall see a more reasonable contemporaneous
response of investment in the next section, when investment adjustment costs are introduced.
27We also report business cycle statistics in Table A.1 of the Appendix. Although highly stylized, business
cycle moments of the calibrated economy are close to those in the U.S. data, suggesting that our model can
replicate the U.S. business cycles reasonably well.
28See, for example, Davis and Haltiwanger (1990), Caballero and Hammour (1994), and Caballero and Ham-
mour (2005).
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full-blown modelhenceforth) is calibrated to U.S. data. Also, it performs well in replicating
important business cycle moments.
3.1 Projects
As in the basic model of Section 2, projects are classied into two types: type-h projects,
constituting a fraction  of all projects, which require working capital to be operative; and
type-l projects, for which working capital is not necessary. We now introduce an additional
dimension of heterogeneity across di¤erent types of projects: type-h projects are associated
with a di¤erent expected level of technology from that of type-l projects.29
The production technology of a type-i project, i 2 fh; lg, is given by
Y it = A
i
t
 
Kit
  
H it
1 
; (14)
where Kit and H
i
t are capital and labor employed in a single type-i project.  < 1, implying
decreasing returns to scale.30 The production technology (14) di¤ers from (2) along two as-
pects. First, labor is introduced as inputs. Second, (14) allows technology Ait to be di¤erent
across projects. Specically, Ait contains three components.
Ait = (1 + g)
t itZt: (15)
The rst part, (1 + g)t, captures the trend of aggregate technology, where g is the long-run
growth rate of aggregate technology. The second and the third parts, it and Zt, respectively,
refer to the project-specic technology and detrended aggregate technology.
We assume again that the magnitude of working capital for a type-h project to be operative
increases in the scale of production. Entrepreneurs of type-h projects face the same limited
enforcement problem of debt repayment as those in the model without labor. Similar to
the model without labor, the incentive-compatibility condition imposes the following nancial
constraint
D

Kht ;H
h
t

 V ht+1 = Et
1X
j=1
^
j
ht+j ; (16)
29As surveyed by Bartelsman and Doms (2000), micro studies have consistently found that there is sizable
dispersion in plant-level productivity within narrowly dened U.S. manufacturing industries. The ratio of
average TFP for plants in the ninth decile of the productivity distribution relative to the average in the second
decile was about 2 to 1 in 1972 and about 2.75 to 1 in 1987. Moreover, more than one third of the plants
remain in the same productivity quintile after ve years (see Bartelsman and Dhrymes, 1998), indicating that
productivity gaps among plants are quite persistent.
30The magnitude of  captures the span of controlof an entrepreneur, as mentioned by Lucas (1978). Basu
and Fernald (1997) estimate returns to scale using data on 34 industries and nd that, without correcting for
aggregation, returns to scale appear strongly diminishing.
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where D
 
Kht ;H
h
t

stands for the divertible resource. At each period, the entrepreneur of a
type-h project chooses capital Kht and labor H
h
t to solve
max
fKht ;Hht g
Aht

Kht
 
Hht
1    (rt + )Kht   wtHht ; (17)
subject to (16) : The problem of an entrepreneur of the type-l project is
max
fKl;Hltg
Alt

K lt
 
H lt
1    (rt + )K lt   wtH lt (18)
The rst-order conditions of (17) and (18) imply the following allocation of capital between
two types of projects.
Aht

Kht
 1 
Hht
(1 )   htDKht
= Alt

K lt
 1 
H lt
(1 )
= rt + ; (19)
where ht is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the nancial constraint (16). Dx denotes
the partial derivative of D to variable x. Similarly, the allocation of labor follows
(1  )Aht

Kht
 
Hht
(1 ) 1   htDHht
= (1  )Alt

K lt
 
H lt
(1 ) 1
= wt: (20)
Two remarks are in order. First, in the rst-best allocation where the nancial constraint
is not binding (ht = 0), both types of projects have the same capital-labor ratio.
Kht
Hht
=
K lt
H lt
=
wt
(1  ) (rt + ) : (21)
Moreover, the rst-best allocation of capital is determined by the relative production technol-
ogy.
Kht
K lt
=

Aht
Alt
 1
1 
: (22)
Second, comparing the rst-order condition in (19), it is immediate that news on an individual
type-h projects future technology Aht+j can a¤ect K
h
t by changing the tightness of nancial
constraint in (16) and, therefore, ht . By contrast, news about A
l
t+j has no direct impacts on
K lt.
31 We will use rm-level data to test this implication in Section 6.
31 In our model, news about Alt+j can a¤ectK
l
t indirectly via the general equilibrium e¤ect since type-l projects
are homogeneous. The general equilibrium e¤ect disappears if we consider Alt+j as an idiosyncratic shock.
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Finally, we parameterize the divertible resource as
D

Kht ;H
h
t

=

Kht
 
Hht
1 
: (23)
(23) is a natural extension of the specication (13). Moreover, (23) gives rise to the following
property: Both types of projects have the same capital-labor ratio, a feature also in the rst-
best allocation (21). The equality of the capital-labor ratio across projects shuts down the
within-project resource misallocation (between capital and labor) as a potential source for
e¢ ciency gain and allows us to focus on the e¤ect of resource reallocation across projects on
aggregate productive e¢ ciency.
3.2 A Decomposition of TFP
We assume that the labor income share is correctly measured, i.e., (1  ) = 1  b; where
1  b stands for the aggregate labor income share. We then decompose the aggregate TFP as
log TFPt = log
P
iA
i
t
 
Kit
  
H it
1 
K
b
t H
1 b
t
= log
P
iA
i
t
 
Kit=H
i
t
( 1)  
Kit

(Kt=Ht)
b 1Kt
= (  1) logKt| {z }
the level e¤ect
+ log
X
i
Ait

Kit
Kt

| {z }
adjusted Solow residual
: (24)
The rst term on the RHS of (24) is a level e¤ect: Given decreasing returns to scale, larger
scales reduce aggregate productivity. The second term is the sum of the project-specic tech-
nology weighted by the share of capital in each type of project, referred to as adjusted Solow
Residual.Accordingly, the percentage deviation of aggregate TFP from its balanced growth
path can be decomposed as
4 log TFPt = 4 log
 
Aht
 
Kht

+ (1  )Alt
 
K lt

Kt
!
= (  1)4 logKt +4 log

Aht

Kht
Kt

+ (1  )Alt

K lt
Kt

; (25)
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where the percentage change of adjusted Solow Residualcan be further decomposed as
4 log

Aht

Kht
Kt

+ (1  )Alt

K lt
Kt

(26)
= 4 log

Aht

Kht
Kt

+ (1  )Alt

K lt
Kt

jKit
Kt
=K
i
K| {z }
the technological e¤ect
+4 log

Aht

Kht
Kt

+ (1  )Alt

K lt
Kt

j
Ait=A
i| {z }
the reallocation e¤ect
+ cross product term.
The rst and second arguments on the RHS of (26) are the technological e¤ect and the
reallocation e¤ect,which bear meanings similar to those of their counterparts in the economy
without labor. Again, in order to highlight the reallocation e¤ect, we specify primitive shocks
as news shocks on future technology (either aggregate or project-specic, as described in more
detail in Section 5.1.2). As a result, changes in adjusted Solow Residualare driven purely
by the reallocation e¤ect before the technology change is materialized.
3.3 Household Sector
We incorporate investment adjustment costs and trend growth in population into the household
problem, as often adopted in the literature. There is a stand-in household with Nt working-age
members at date t. The size of the household evolves over time exogenously at a constant rate
n = Nt=Nt 1   1. In this framework, the representative households problem solves
max
fct;ht;kt+1g1t=0
E0
" 1X
t=0
tNtu (ct; ht)
#
;
subject to
Ct +G (It;Kt) = (rt + )Kt + wtHt + (1  )lt + ht ; (27)
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + It; (28)
G (It;Kt) = It + 

It
Kt
     n  gy
2
Kt: (29)
where ct  Ct=Nt is per member consumption, ht  Ht=Nt is the fraction of hours worked
per member of the household. It stands for investment and  is the coe¢ cient of investment
adjustment costs. The role of investment adjustment costs (29) will be discussed in Section
5.3.1. gy is the growth rate of output per capita at the balanced growth path, which follows
1 + gy = (1 + g)
1
1  (1 + n)
 1
1  :
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The rst-order conditions imply the following standard equations
uc (ct; ht)wt =  uh (ct; ht) ; (30)
qt = 1 + 2

It
Kt
     n  gy

; (31)
qtuc (ct; ht) = Et
24uc (ct+1; ht+1)
0@ rt +  + 2

It
Kt
     n  gy

It
Kt
 

It
Kt
     n  gy
2
+ qt+1 (1  )
1A35 ; (32)
where qt is the marginal q, and ux (ct; ht) is the marginal utility (or disutility) associated with
variable x; x = c or h: Equation (30) is the rst-order condition for labor. Equation (31) is
the rst-order condition for investment, and Equation (32) is the standard Euler equation with
quadratic adjustment costs.
Finally, we keep the timing and information structures the same as those in the economy
without labor.
3.4 Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium of this economy consists of an allocation fCt;Ht;Kt+1g1t=0 for the
representative household, allocation fKht ;Hht ;K lt;H ltg1t=0 for entrepreneurs and price system
fwt; rtg such that
 Given prices, the allocation fCt;Ht;Kt+1g1t=0 solves the households problem (27).
 Given prices, the allocation fKht ;Hht ;K lt;H ltg1t=0 solves the entrepreneurs prot maxi-
mization problems (17) and (18).
 Capital market clears: Kht + (1  )K lt = Kt.
 Labor market clears: Hht + (1  )H lt = Ht.
 Good market clears:
Ct +G (It;Kt) = Yt  Aht

Kht
 
Hht
1 
+ (1  )Alt

K lt
 
H lt
1 
:
For numerical simulation, we also dene the recursive competitive equilibrium in Section
8.2 of the Appendix. We solve for decision rules by policy function iterations.
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4 Calibration
In this section, we calibrate the full-blown model using data from the 2005 revision of National
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) to match the average values of U.S. data over the 1960-
2004 period. Our measure of capital stock includes government capital and stock of consumer
durables, following Cooley and Prescott (1995). Again, one period in the model corresponds
to one calendar year.
4.1 Preference
We let the period utility of the household follow the utility specication in Greenwood, Her-
cowitz and Ho¤man (1988, GHHhenceforth).
u(ct; ht) =

ct     t h
1+
t
1+
1 
  1
1   ; (33)
where  t = (1 + gy)
t is incorporated in the utility to ensure the stationarity of hours on the
balanced growth path. Under GHH preference, the income e¤ect on labor supply is shut down,
and the only channel for shocks to a¤ect labor supply is the substitution e¤ect of changes in
wage rates.32
We set  to 0.4 to match a Frisch elasticity of 2.5.33 The parameter  is set to 1.5 so that
the hours worked is 0.31 at the steady state. The discount factor  is set to 0.979, implying a
steady state real interest rate of 4 percent. The population growth rate n is set to 0.0147, which
is the average growth rate of the civilian non-institutional population aged 16 over between
1960 and 2004.
4.2 Technology
We set gy = 0:0183, which is consistent with the long-run average growth rate of U.S. real GNP
per capita. We set  to 0:85, the value used by Atkeson and Kehoe (2001). The parameter
 is then set so that the labor income share is 0.6. This yields a value of  of 0.294. The
depreciation rate  is set to match an investment capital ratio of 0.074, the average between
1960 and 2004. This gives  = 0:04. The adjustment cost parameter, , is set to 2.0, which is
close to the estimated result of Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995).
32Greenwood et al. (1988) show that, ceterus paribus, models that adopt this type of preference can generate
hours volatility over the business cycles closer to the U.S. data than models using the preference that were
described in King, Plosser and Rebelo (1998).
33A Frisch elasticity of 2.5 reects both the intensive and extensive margins of aggregate labor supply.
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As a baseline case, we keep the level of project-specic technology it constant over time
and equal to i. The specication for news shocks on aggregate technology is the same as
that in (9) : We normalize the type-l project-specic technology l to 1: To calibrate ; h;
the type-h project-specic technology and , the pledgeable share of future project value, we
exploit the fact that on the balanced growth path,
h =
1b(1+gy)   1
1  =

Y
h
=H
h
Y
l
=H
l
 ; (34)
where variables with upper bars denote the steady-state values of their detrended counter-
parts.34 Since both the capital-output ratio and the ratio of labor productivity of two types
of projects are closely related to h and , we can calibrate the values of ; h and  simulta-
neously to match two targets: an empirical ratio of labor productivity of 2 between the 25th
and the 75th percentile producers and an aggregate capital-output ratio of 2.5.35 Note that
there is an identication problem, in the sense that we need to choose three parameter values
to match two ratios. Since in our model there are only two types of projects, we let  = 0:5
so that the median of type-h and type-l projects corresponds to the 75th- and 25th-percentile
producers, respectively.36 Accordingly, h = 1:69 and  = 0:10:37 The value of h implies a
value of 0.26 for the standard deviation of logi, which is well within the range estimated in
the literature.38 Our sensitivity analysis in Section 5.3.1 shows that the following quantitative
results are essentially unchanged with  = 0:25, and h and  recalibrated to match the same
moments.
For all other parameters, the calibration follows the same procedure as in the economy
without labor. Table 2 summarizes the calibrated parameters.
34We detrend each aggregate variable except hours input by dividing it by ((1 + gy) (1 + n))t : Aggregate
hours are detrended by (1 + n)t. Equation (34) is obtained by computing the steady state value of the ratio of
marginal product of capital, which is equivalent to the ratio of labor productivity in our model.
35According to Bartelsman and Doms (2001) and Table 1 in Syverson (2004), the average ratio of the labor
productivity of the 25th-percentile producers to the 75th-percentile producers is about 2.
36Recall that our choice of  = 0:5 is motivated by the evidence in Kaplan and Zingales (1997).
37A higher expected level of technology for type-h projects is consistent with the empirical ndings. For
instance, Carpenter and Peterson (2002) nd that many small high-tech rms in the Compustat database
obtain little debt nancing. Accordingly, Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999) nd that rms with
stronger growth opportunities and higher R&D expenses, as measured by a high market to book ratio and R&D
to sales ratio, have larger cash holdings, suggesting that they are more likely to be credit-constrained.
38Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) specied a log AR(1) process for the plant-specic shock and obtained a
value of 0.64 for the estimated standard deviation.
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Table 2. Parameter Values For the Full-Blown Economy
Symbol Denition Value
Demographics
n Population growth rate 0.015
Technology
 Capital share in production function 0.294
gy Growth rate of output per capita 0.018
 Entrepreneurial survival rate 0.90
 Depreciation rate for capital 0.04
h Expected type-h project-specic technology 1.69
 Production parameter 0.85
 Autocorrelation coe¢ cient 0.95
Z Standard deviation of information innovation 0.013
 Adjustment cost parameter 2.0
Preference
 Discount factor in utility function 0.979
 Disutility parameter for leisure 1.6
 Coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion 1
 Inverse of Frisch elasticity 0.4
Market
 Default parameter 0.10
 Fraction of high-tech projects 0.50
5 Results
In this section, we rst plot impulse responses of macro aggregates to news shocks on future
technology improvements. We then report the business cycle statistics. Finally, we quantify
the importance of our model mechanism for TFP uctuations.
5.1 Impulse Responses to News
The experiments for impulse responses are similar to those in the economy without labor. As a
baseline case, the economy is subject to news shocks on aggregate technological improvement.
Later, we also report impulse responses to news shocks on technological improvement specic
to type-h projects. That experiment might help us to understand the role of nancial frictions
on capital allocation when there are good prospects on future protability that are specic to
some high-tech industries, such as the IT industry in the late 1990s.
5.1.1 Impulse Response to News on the Aggregate Technology Zt
Figure 4 depicts the response of capital reallocation, together with nancial ctions of allocating
capital, measured by the ratio of marginal productivity of capital between two types of projects.
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We see from panel A that in response to the news shocks, the ratio decreases by about 0.4
percent and stays below the steady-state level throughout the boom period. This suggests
that the countercyclical feature of nancial frictions on capital allocation still prevails when
endogenous labor supply and reallocation are allowed for. The magnitude of capital reallocation
on impact, as plotted in panel B, is 1.0 percent of capital stock.
[Insert Figure 4]
The reduction of nancial frictions on capital allocation results in an increase in aggregate
productive e¢ ciency. This is evident from Figures 5 and 6, which plot the response of aggregate
TFP and its components to the good news. The initial response of TFP amounts to 0:36
percent, which is roughly one third of the magnitude of the TFP increase when technology
improvement is realized.39 Such a magnitude is quantitatively in line with the empirical ndings
of Beaudry and Portier (Figure 1, 2006), who use structural VAR models to estimate the
responses of TFP to a news shock. The decomposition in Figure 6 shows that reallocation
e¤ects explain all the increase in TFP before the technology improvement is materialized.
Moreover, as in the benchmark model, the transmission mechanism in our model economy
is capable of amplifying the e¤ects of technological shocks. Figure 4 shows that variations in
nancial frictions have persistent e¤ects; the gap ofMPK reverts gradually to the steady state.
The corresponding reallocation e¤ect, therefore, also serves as an amplication mechanism by
contributing to TFP uctuations at period 2 and afterwards, as illustrated by Figure 6.
[Insert Figure 5, 6 and 7]
The increase in aggregate TFP on impact leads to comovement of macro aggregates, as can
be seen in Figure 7. Though the exogenous technology improvement materializes at period 2,
the economy starts to boom at period 1. Consumption, investment, output and hours worked
all increase on impact. As one can see from the rst two columns of Table 3, the e¤ects of
such a news shock are sizable for most variables except hours worked: output, consumption
and investment increase by 0:43 percent, 0:45 percent and 0:35 percent, respectively. In short,
similar to the model without labor, the increase in TFP arising from resource allocation in our
full-blown model also generates business cycles.
39Figure 5 also shows that the level e¤ect plays a minor role in the change of aggregate TFP, especially during
the initial periods.
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Table 3. Responses to News on Aggregate Technology and Project-Specic Technology
Z Ah
t = 1 t = 2 t = 1 t = 2
Y 0:43 2:01 0:59 0:97
C 0:45 1:73 0:70 0:90
I 0:35 3:36 0:13 1:29
H 0:13 1:33 0:18 0:17
TFP 0:36 1:20 0:49 0:86
Note: Numbers in the table are the percentage deviation from the steady-state value. Parameter
values are in Table 2.
5.1.2 Impulse Response to News on the Type-h Technology ht
The U.S. boom in the 1990s was fueled largely by the optimism of a New Economy,repre-
sented by technological breakthroughs in the computer sector and their wide usage in other
sectors. Therefore, it is natural to think of one candidate for primitive shocks as news on
future advances of technology in the high-tech industry.
Therefore, we consider news shocks on type-h project-specic technology. Specically, we
let Zt and lt remain constant (equal to their mean) and assume that
loght+1 = (1  ) log h +  loght + 
h
t ; (35)
where 
h
t denotes information innovation on the next-period technology, 
h
t+1. Here, again,
we assume that news shocks in the current period are uncorrelated with current technology
ht ; rather, it is a perfect signal on the future technology innovation observed by all agents in
this economy.
To compare the results from shocks on aggregate and project-specic technology, we keep
the same parameterization as in Table 3, except for the variance of information innovations,
denoted by 
h
 . We choose the value of 
h
 such that the standard deviation of the log of
H-P detrended TFP simulated from the model is equal to the corresponding value in annual
U.S. data. The calibration gives 
h
 = 2:24%.
The experiment is similar to the previous one: at period 0, the economy is at the steady
state. At the beginning of period 1, all agents receive unanticipated news that ht will increase
by one percent at period 2. At the beginning of period 2, the technology improvement is
materialized.
Although the dynamics are qualitatively similar, with news shocks on h, their e¤ects are
quantitatively larger compared to the baseline case.40 In particular, the initial response of
40We suppress gures of impulse response functions due to their similarity to Figures 4 to 7.
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aggregate TFP becomes considerably larger. It increases by nearly 0:50 percent, more than
half of the increase in aggregate TFP when the technology improvement is realized (Table 3).
Again, the large response of aggregate TFP on impact is purely due to the reallocation e¤ect.
The intuition for stronger e¤ects of news shocks on the project-specic technology is as follows.
Given l unchanged, capital demanded by type-h projects will be rented at a relatively cheaper
price than with news shocks to aggregate technology. This implies a larger increase in future
prot for type-h projects. A higher project value, accordingly, relaxes the nancial constraint
by a larger extent and induces more resource to ow from type-l to type-h projects. Financial
frictions on capital allocation, measured by the gap in marginal productivity of capital, reduce
more sharply by 0:57 percent on impact. Capital reallocation in response to news shocks to h
(with a size of 1:43 percent), accordingly, turns out to be more active than its counterpart to
news shocks on Z (with a size of 1:05 percent). Finally, the initial response of macroeconomic
variables is also remarkable. The news drives the initial aggregate output by 0:59 percent, more
than half of the output increase when the technological improvement is realized at period 2
(see, also, the third and fourth columns of Table 3).
5.2 Business Cycle Statistics
We have shown the role of nancial frictions on capital allocation as a transmission mechanism
of aggregate TFP uctuations. Moreover, the resulting aggregate TFP uctuation leads to
business cycles by allowing positive comovement of macro aggregates. In this subsection, we
explore how our model performs in other dimensions of business cycles. We compare business
cycle moments in the U.S. data with those simulated from the calibrated model with two
di¤erent specications for news shocks, (9) and (35). To simulate the economy, we rst use the
quadrature method described in Tauchen and Hussey (1991) to construct a nine-state Markov
chain that approximates news shock processes (9) and (35), respectively. We then simulate
the economy 1000 times, each containing 45 periods, as our data span for 45 years. Then,
both articial and actual U.S. data are H-P ltered with a weight of 100. We use their cyclical
components to compute the business cycle statistics for both data series. Table 4 reports the
sample mean of the standard deviation of macro variables.
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Table 4. Volatility of Macro Variables
Data Model Specications
News to Z News to h
Used for calibration
the standard deviation of TFP 0:0125 0:0123 0:0127
Not used for calibration
the standard deviation of output 0:0173 0:0212 0:0131
the standard deviation of consumption 0:0120 0:0176 0:0118
the standard deviation of investment 0:0597 0:0378 0:0233
the standard deviation of hours 0:0154 0:0151 0:0024
We rst examine the results in the baseline case of news shocks to Z, the aggregate technol-
ogy. Volatility of macro aggregates is reported in the middle column of Table 4. Note that the
standard deviation of simulated output is equal to 2.12 percent, larger than the corresponding
value in the U.S. data (1.73 percent). By contrast, output data simulated from standard RBC
models are less volatile than the U.S. data. This suggests that the presence of nancial frictions
amplies business cycle uctuations, as pointed out by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), among
many others. The simulated volatilities of consumption and investment have the standard
ordering: consumption is less volatile and investment is more volatile relative to output. The
volatility of hours implied by the model is almost the same as in the data. To sum up, business
cycle moments of the calibrated economy are close to those in the U.S. data, suggesting that
our model can replicate U.S. business cycles reasonably well.
The results in the case of news shocks to h are given in the right column of Table 4.
Not surprisingly, the volatilities fall sharply, since type-l projects are immune to news shocks.
The decline in the volatility of hours is the most remarkable. Recall that the wage rate
is determined by the marginal labor productivity of type-l projects (see equation 20). The
constancy of project-specic technology l thus implies a rather stable wage rate and labor
supply over business cycles.
The cross-correlation statistics is reported in Table A-2 in the Appendix. The main feature
is that under both types of news shocks, all macro variables are highly procyclical, consistent
with the stylized fact of U.S. business cycles. With only one shock, our model, like standard
RBC models, tends to overestimate contemporaneous correlation coe¢ cients.
5.3 Quantifying the Importance of the Model Mechanism
We further examine the quantitative importance of the above mechanism for TFP uctuations
over U.S. business cycles. As mentioned in the introduction, TFP uctuations play a central
26
role in U.S. business cycles. This feature is well captured by our model, as well as by pre-
vious business cycle models, though our primitive shocks are fundamentally di¤erent. In our
calibrated models, news about future improvement in Z or h causes a reduction in nancial
frictions on capital allocations. This results in an increase in aggregate TFP, which leads to
news-driven business cycles (NDBC henceforth) featuring comovement of output, consump-
tion, investment and hours simultaneously. By contrast, without the e¢ ciency gain from the
endogenous variation of nancial frictions, news shocks, which are unrelated to the current
technology, can hardly lead to an economic expansion: Consumption and investment or hours
will comove negatively due to the tension between the income and the substitution e¤ects
of news shocks.41 A positive comovement of macro aggregates is a stylized fact of business
cycles. Therefore, in this section, we take two approaches to examining the relevance of the
mechanism illustrated here for TFP uctuations over U.S. business cycles. First, we check
the robustness of our model on the positive comovement of macro aggregates under di¤erent
parameterization. Second, we show analytically that variations in frictions on new capital
investment cannot generate comovement of macro aggregates.
5.3.1 Robustness Check for News-Driven Business Cycles
We rst check the robustness of our comovement result for two parameters: the adjustment
cost coe¢ cient  and the inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution : The magnitude
of these two parameters governs the trade-o¤ between current consumption and investment.42
The possible ranges of parameter values that can generate NDBC are given in Table 5.
Table 5. Ranges of Parameter Values that Generate NDBC
 
News Shock to Z (0:13;1) (0:11; 1:48)
News Shock to h (0;1) (0; 2:95)
For a news shock to Z, the adjustment cost coe¢ cient  has to be larger than 0:13, which
is lower than the lowest estimate of 0:20 in the literature (see Cooper and Haltiwanger, 2006).
41 In standard RBC models, anticipation of future technological improvement will increase current consumption
and reduce investment through the income e¤ect. On the other hand, a higher rate of return for investment will
tend to increase investment and postpone consumption via the substitution e¤ect. The relative importance of
these two e¤ects depends on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Moreover, good news will reduce the
labor supply through a negative income e¤ect, because the orthogonality of news shocks to current technology
causes no substitution e¤ect.
42The value of Frisch elasticity  determines the magnitude of labor supply response. However, our comove-
ment result holds for the whole domain of , as the GHH preference has shut down the income e¤ect on labor
supply.
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Note that adjustment costs cannot help to generate comovement of macro aggregates in stan-
dard neoclassical models, as shown by Beaudry and Portier (2007). By contrast, introducing
adjustment costs in the present model helps investment to comove with output and consump-
tion. To see this, consider a news shock that predicts future technological improvement. If ;
the inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution, were very large, agents would increase
consumption substantially for consumption smoothing, resulting in a decline in investment.
However, this would not occur with su¢ ciently large adjustment costs since, otherwise, agents
would have to pay large adjustment costs to increase investment when the technological im-
provement materializes.
To have the comovement of consumption and investment,  has to fall into the range of
(0:11; 1:48) under the benchmark parameterization. If  is too small, consumption will decline
in the rst period due to the very large intertemporal elasticity of substitution. On the other
hand, if  is too large, the desire for consumption smoothing is too strong, resulting in a large
initial response of consumption to news shocks, which forces investment to decline. This also
implies that larger capital adjustment costs tend to relax the upper bound of . In fact, if
we increase the adjustment cost coe¢ cient to 5, a value within the range estimated by the
literature (see Cooper and Haltiwanger, 2006), the upper bound of  increases to 1:91.
The conditions for comovement are substantially relaxed when news shocks are project-
specic. Under benchmark parameterization, business cycles can be triggered by expectations
in an economy without capital adjustment costs. The upper bound of  also increases to 2:95.
This is because, with project-specic news shocks, the response of aggregate TFP on impact is
quantitatively larger, making the tension between the income and substitution e¤ect of news
shocks less severe.
We next check the robustness of our quantitative results for , the share of constrained
rms. Although the parameterization of  in the benchmark case can be motivated from the
empirical study of Kaplan and Zingales (1997), it is worth assessing the extent to which the
choice of  may change the results. To this end, we reduce the share of constrained rms by
half so that  = 0:25: Our targets are the same as in our benchmark model: an empirical
ratio of labor productivity of 2 between the 25th- and the 75th-percentile producers and an
aggregate capital-output ratio of 2.5. Since rm-specic productivity is homogeneous within
each type of entrepreneur in our model,  = 0:25 can be seen as a lower bound for the fraction
of constrained rms in order to match the labor productivity ratio between the 25th- and the
75th-percentile producers. Accordingly, h = 2:0 and  = 0:086:43
43We also recalibrate  = 1:72 to match hours worker to be 0.31 at the steady state.
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The rst two columns of Table 6 report the impulse responses of macro aggregates to a one-
percent positive news shock on Z. The impulse responses to a one-percent positive news shock
on Ah are given in the third and fourth columns. Interestingly, the results are essentially the
same as those in Table 3. The reason for the similarity of impulse responses under di¤erent  is
as follows. A smaller share of nancially constrained rms tends to reduce the total amount of
capital reallocated from type-l to type-h projects and, thus, the aggregate e¢ ciency gain from
reallocation, as shown by the reallocation e¤ect in equation (26). On the other hand, it also
tends to increase the capital-output ratio at the aggregate level. To maintain the aggregate
capital-output ratio, an increase in h is required.44 A higher h facilitates more capital to
be reallocated from type-l to type-h projects and, therefore, tends to increase the aggregate
e¢ ciency gains. Our simulation indicates that the negative e¤ect of a small  and the positive
e¤ect of a large h on the reallocation e¤ect in equation (26) are quantitatively similar under
our calibration strategy and, therefore, create no major changes to our results. Overall, the
above robustness checks indicate that the mechanism described in this paper may well be
quantitatively important for TFP uctuations over U.S. business cycles.
Table 6. Responses to News on Aggregate Technology and Project-Specic Technology
( = 0:25)
Z Ah
t = 1 t = 2 t = 1 t = 2
Y 0:44 2:02 0:60 0:99
C 0:46 1:74 0:71 0:91
I 0:36 3:27 0:13 1:31
H 0:13 1:33 0:18 0:18
TFP 0:36 1:20 0:49 0:88
Note: Numbers in the table are the percentage deviation from the steady state value.  = 0:25,
h = 2:0,  = 0:086 and  = 1:72: All other parameter values are in Table 2.
5.3.2 Non-existence of NDBC with Frictions on New Capital Investment
Note that there may exist other channels for nancial frictions to a¤ect aggregate productive
e¢ ciency. For example, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) construct a model in which nancial
frictions are imposed on new investment, instead of on capital allocation. Which mechanism is
empirically more relevant for driving TFP uctuations over business cycles? In Section of 8.3
in the Appendix, we show analytically that in two-sector models with nancial frictions on the
new investment goods sector, consumption, hours and investment must comove negatively upon
44Accordingly, a lower  is needed to maintain the ratio of labor productivity of two types of projects, as
indicated by equation (34) :
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news shocks. The intuition is as follows. Variations of frictions on new investment in response
to primitive shocks cannot a¤ect productive e¢ ciency on impact. Moreover, a relaxation of
the nancial constraint induces capital and labor to shift from the consumption good to the
investment good sector. As a result, consumption and investment move in opposite directions.
Such a negative correlation is at odds with the stylized facts of business cycles. Accordingly,
it casts doubt on the empirical relevancy of frictions in the investment good sectors as a source
of TFP uctuations. In our model, by contrast, relaxing the nancial constraint can trigger
an immediate expansion of TFP by reallocating existing resources. This makes the positive
comovement of macro aggregates feasible. We now turn to the U.S. data to directly test our
theory.
6 Empirical Evidence
So far, we have constructed a theory in which nancial frictions on capital allocation serve as
a transmission mechanism of TFP uctuations. To what extent is our proposed mechanism
empirically relevant for aggregate TFP uctuations? An answer to this question relies on
two sub-questions. First, to what extent do resource reallocations contribute to aggregate
productivity uctuations? Given its quantitative importance, the next question is whether
primitive shocks can lead to countercyclical variations in nancial frictions and, therefore,
resource reallocation over the business cycles.
The evidence from Basu and Fernald (2000) provides strong support for the importance
of reallocation for aggregate productivity uctuations over business cycles. Specically, they
decompose aggregate Solow residuals into four components: (i) procyclical technology shock;
(ii) widespread imperfect competition and increasing returns; (iii) variable utilization of input
over the cycle; and (iv) resource reallocation. The reallocation e¤ect reects changes in an
economys ability to produce goods and services for nal consumption from given primary in-
puts of capital and labor. Using industry-level data compiled by Dale Jorgenson and Barbara
Fraumeni, Basu and Fernald nd that when subtracting the estimated reallocation terms from
Solow residuals, the correlation between Solow residuals and output fell to about zero. This in-
dicates that reallocation over the business cycle is key to understanding aggregate productivity
uctuations.
Regarding the second question, our theory suggests a role for news shocks to cause variations
in nancial frictions, which trigger capital reallocation and aggregate TFP uctuations. The
theory delivers two testable implications regarding the transmission mechanism. First, nancial
frictions on capital allocation are countercyclical. This implies that nancially constrained
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rms acquire more capital in boom than unconstrained rms do, while the opposite is true
in recession. Second, the key reason for frictions on capital allocation to be countercyclical is
that prospects on an individual rms future protability a¤ect nancially constrained rms
capital acquisition, but not unconstrained rms. In other words, the presence of nancial
constraint allows changes in the rm-level forecast of future protability to a¤ect current
capital allocation.45 The rest of the section aims to test both implications using rm-level
data.
6.1 Data
One of the major di¢ culties of the test is how to distinguish rms that are nancially con-
strained from those that are not. We use an index constructed by Lamont, Polk and Saa-
Requejo (2001), which is based on Kaplan and Zingales (1997), to measure the likelihood of a
rm being nancial constrained. We denote the index as KZ.
KZ is a weighted average of a rm-years cash ow, cash dividends, cash balances, leverage
and rms average Q, with negative weights on the rst three and positive ones on the last two.
These weights are obtained by estimation of ordered logit models of the probability that a rm
falls in one of the ve categories: (1) not nancially constrained; (2) likely not to be nancially
constrained; (3) di¢ cult to classify as either constrained or not; (4) likely to be nancially
constrained; (5) undoubtedly to be nancially constrained.46 A higher KZ, therefore, implies
a higher possibility of being nancially constrained. The KZ index has been adapted in some
recent empirical work by Lamont, Polk and Saa-Requejo (2001) and Baker, Stein and Wurgler
(2003). In particular, Baker et al. (2003) found that the investment of rms with larger KZ is
more sensitive in response of Q. We will borrow the empirical strategy of Baker et al. (2003),
with a focus on the impact of protability forecasts on acquisition (rather than the impact of
Q on investment).
Forecast data are obtained from the IBES database. IBES asks analysts to provide forecasts
of earnings for each rm in the database. Three variables are available: one- and two-year-
ahead forecasts for earnings per share, and the long-term growth forecast (LTG) representing
an expected annual growth in earnings over the next business cycle (a period over the next three
45This is because capital deployed in nancially unconstrained rms can be a¤ected only by the current level
of technology (see equation 19). Moreover, if the news is common to all rms (e.g., news on future aggregate
technological improvement), it may even exert a negative e¤ect on capital deployed in nancially unconstrained
rms via the general equilibrium e¤ect on the interest rate in (19).
46See Kaplan and Zingales (1997) for details on how to classify the rm-years into these ve categories based
on both objective and subjective criteria. Since rms average Q is closely related to expected future prots, we
use a four-variable version of the index that omits average Q (see, also, Baker, Stein and Wurgler, 2003). Using
the original index does not change our main results.
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to ve years). When calculating their forecasts of long-term growth, IBES instructs analysts
to ignore the current state of the business cycle and to project, instead, the expected trend
growth of the companys earnings. Thus, by the instruction of IBES, the long-term growth
forecasts should contain information not in the one-year-ahead and two-year-ahead forecasts,
which necessarily will be a¤ected by current conditions.47 Instead, it captures information on
variables that a¤ect rmsprotability over the next business cycle. This objective is exactly
in line with our denition of news shocks.Therefore, we use long-term growth forecast as a
proxy for newsin our model. We use the mean of LTG across analysts.48
Firm-level data on capital reallocation and variables used to construct the KZ index are
from Compustat.49 Compustat data distinguish between expenditure on new capital invest-
ment (Item 128) and expenditure on existing capital. Deploying existing capital can take two
approaches: transfer of ownership of capital (acquisition and plant/equipment sales) and capi-
tal lease. Leasing is especially relevant for small rms, which are found to be more vulnerable
to nancial constraints.50 Compustat provides information on rental expenses, which include
operating lease expenses in addition to other payments associated with the lease. However,
measuring operating expenses for leasing existing capital is di¢ cult. Therefore, our measure-
ment of the size of capital reallocation (CR) for each individual rm includes only acquisition
(Compustat Annual Item 129) minus sale of property, plant and equipment (Item 107), though
we fully realize that inclusion of leasing expenses for used capital is desirable for future re-
search. Following Baker et al. (2003), we exclude nancial rms (i.e., rms with a one-digit
SIC of six) and rm-years with a book value under $10 million, but include all observations
with data on capital reallocation and the KZ index.
The combination of Compustat and IBES databases results in an unbalanced panel that
covers the period between 1971 and 2005.51 The full sample includes 30412 observations,
for an average of 1601 observations per year. We use CRit=AT
i
t 1 as the scaled measure of
capital reallocation, where AT denotes book assets (Compustat Annual Item 6). To reduce
the inuence of outliers, we Winsorize each of the variables used at the rst and ninety-
ninth percentile; i.e., we set all variables beyond these tolerances to the rst and ninety-ninth
47 See also Cummins et al. (2006, pp. 799) for a detailed description of the construction of long-term growth
forecasts by IBES.
48Using the median value of LTG, as recommended by IBES, gives similar results.
49All nancial variables from Compustat are adjusted to 1971 USD using CPI.
50For example, using data from the 1992 Census of Manufactures, Eisfeldt and Rampini (2008b) found that
rms in the smallest size decile rent more than 46 percent of their capital, while rms in the largest decile rent
about 11 percent of their capital on average, and the fraction rented is monotonically decreasing across size
deciles.
51The Appendix, available upon request, provides details for how to merge Compustat and IBES databases.
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percentile values, respectively. Our results hold qualitatively without Winsorizing the data.52
Table 7 reports summary statistics for CRit=AT
i
t 1, LTGit and KZit .
Table 7. Summary Statistics
mean SD max min
CRit=AT
i
t 1 0.0334 0.1076 0.6716 -0.1127
LTGit 0.1812 0.0984 0.5367 0.0202
KZit 0.2462 1.2776 4.1729 -6.5283
6.2 Countercyclicality of Financial Frictions on Capital Allocation
We now provide evidence on the rst prediction: Financially constrained rms acquire more
capital in boom than unconstrained rms do, while the opposite is true in recession. Put
di¤erently, we should observe that capital reallocation for nancially constrained rms is more
volatile along business cycles than that of unconstrained rms. As mentioned above, this
implication is the prerequisite for frictions on capital allocation to be countercyclical.
We use CRJt  1NJ
P
i2KZJ CR
i
t=AT
i
t 1 to measure the average size of capital reallocation
for rms whose mean value of KZit over the full sample period belongs to the J-th quintile,
where NJ refers to the number of rms in the J-th quintile. dCRJt is the cyclical component of
CRJt obtained by H-P lter. Compustat started to record acquisition (item 129) since 1971.
Therefore, we have data ondCRJt from 1971 to 2005. Figure 8 plotsdCR1t anddCR5t (i.e., size of
total acquisition by rms in the bottom and top KZ quintiles, respectively), together with the
H-P ltered real U.S. GNP, denoted by \GNP t: Note that sizes of capital reallocation before
1980 are much smaller than those afterwards. It is obvious in Figure 8 that after 1980, while
both of dCR1t and dCR5t are procyclical, capital reallocation for rms in the top KZ quintile is
much more volatile than that for rms in the bottom quintile.
[Insert Figure 8]
More precisely, Table 8 shows that the standard deviation of dCRJt is monotonically in-
creasing in J . The increase of volatility is sizable: the variance ofdCR5t more than doubles the
variance of dCR1t . Due to limited sizes of capital reallocation in Compustat in the 1970s, one
may suspect that capital reallocation has a much smaller e¤ect on business cycles before 1980.
For this concern, we also report results for the sub-sample period from 1981 to 2005. We see
that for that period, the monotonicity of the standard deviation of dCRJt along J still holds.
52We Winsorize the ingredients of the KZ index before constructing it.
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Table 8. Financial Constraint and Standard Deviation of Capital Reallocation
Full Sample (1971-2005) Sub-sample (1981-2005)dCR1 0.0050 0.0051dCR2 0.0057 0.0073dCR3 0.0064 0.0082dCR4 0.0087 0.0098dCR5 0.0117 0.0153
6.3 Asymmetric Impacts of News Shocks
It is natural to ask further what causes the countercyclicality of nancial frictions on capital
allocation. To this end, we test the second implication of our model: Prospects on an individual
rms future protability a¤ect constrained rmscapital acquisition, but not that of uncon-
strained rms. This hypothesis, together with the procyclicality of forecast on individual rms
future protability, provides a micro-foundation for nancial frictions on capital allocation to
be countercyclical.
We apply the method of Baker et al. (2003) to test the implications. All rms in the
sample data are classied into quintiles according to their mean value of KZit over the full
sample period. For each KZ quintile, we estimate
CRit
AT it 1
= ai + at + b  LTGit + uit; (36)
where ai and at are rm and year dummies, respectively. Note that LTGit is, by denition, un-
correlated to uit. The hypothesis implies that the estimated coe¢ cient b should be statistically
insignicant for rms in lower KZ quintiles, while signicantly positive for rms in higher KZ
quintiles.
Table 9. Business Prospects and Capital Reallocation
KZ index b Obs. Adj. R2
Quintile 1  0:0453
(0:021)
6075 0:2224
2 0:0032
(0:021)
6084 0:1826
3 0:0857
(0:023)
6086 0:1753
4 0:1194
(0:026)
6078 0:2375
5 0:1544
(0:032)
6089 0:2588
Note:  and  stand for is signicant at 1% and 5%, respectively. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses.
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Table 9 presents the estimated results. As predicted by the theory, the estimates of b
are positive and highly signicant for the third to fth quintiles and not signicant, or even
negative, for the rst two quintiles.53 Moreover, there is a strong positive correlation between
KZ and the e¤ect of long-term growth forecasts on capital reallocation. The coe¢ cient b rises
monotonically from 0:087 in the third quintile to 0:154 in the top quintile, suggesting that the
rms that are more likely to be nancially constrained have a stronger sensitivity of capital
reallocation to long-term forecasts than rms that are less likely to be nancially constrained.
We use the mean value ofKZit over the full sample period to measure the likelihood for each
rm to be nancially constrained. A key issue is whether the likelihood varies over time. As a
robustness check, we classify rms based on their ve-year mean value ofKZit and run the same
panel regression (36) for each KZ quintile. Column (1) of Table 10 shows that our main results
still hold. In Column (2), we add the ratio of cash ow over AT it 1 (Compustat Annual Item
14 + Item 18) to the regression as control variables.54 The results are qualitatively the same
as those in Table 9. As a further check, we replace LTG with long-run real Qconstructed by
the way proposed in Cummins et al. (2006). The long-run real Q computes the two-year-ahead
expected market value for each rm according to two-year-ahead earnings forecasts and the
long-term growth forecasts LTG. One-year-ahead earnings forecasts are excluded since they
are most likely a¤ected by the current state of the economy. Column (3) of Table 10 shows
that the estimates of b now become positive and highly signicant for each quintile. This is
not surprising; the estimated b is biased upwards since two-year-ahead earnings forecasts are
likely correlated to uit. However, the strong positive correlation between KZ and the e¤ect
of expected market value on capital reallocation still holds. Further, the coe¢ cient b rises
monotonically from 0:0034 in the bottom quintile to 0:0412 in the top quintile.
53The negative estimated b may reect the fact that rm-level variations in the expected future protability
contains information at the aggregate level. In our model, news on aggregate future technological improvement
causes capital to ow from nancially unconstrained to constrained rms via the general equilibrium e¤ect.
54We multiply the one- and two-year-ahead earning forecasts per share by the number of shares outstanding
to yield forecasts of future earning levels. We use a discount rate of 0:91, as in Cummins et al. (2006). The
results are insensitive to the value of the discount rate.
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Table 10. Robustness Check
KZ index (1) (2) (3)
Quintile 1  0:0092
(0:023)
 0:0493
(0:021)
0:0034
(0:002)
2  0:0122
(0:022)
 0:0026
(0:021)
0:0094
(0:002)
3 0:0672
(0:028)
0:069
(0:023)
0:0197
(0:003)
4 0:0875
(0:032)
0:1016
(0:026)
0:0345
(0:003)
5 0:1368
(0:036)
0:1126
(0:032)
0:0412
(0:004)
Note:  and  stand for signicant at 1% and 5%, respectively. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. In Column (1), we classify rms based on their ve-year mean value of KZit . In Column
(2), we add a ratio of cash ow over AT it 1 as two control variables. Column (3) drops control variables
in Column (2), but replaces LTG with the long-run realQ in Cummins et al. (2006). We use the sample
mean of KZit to classify rms in Column (2) and (3). Using ve-year mean values gives qualitatively
similar results.
Our rm-level evidence is consistent with the above macro evidence on capital allocation
over the business cycles. This is because LTGit in boom periods are, on average, higher than
those in recessions. For instance, the mean of LTGit across rms in the period of 1997-2000
is 23:71, much higher than that of 17:57 in the period of 1991-1994. Therefore, asymmetric
impacts of news on capital acquisition across nancially constrained and unconstrained rms,
together with the procyclical movements of LTGit, provide an explanation for the countercycli-
cality of nancial frictions documented in the previous subsection.
In summary, we nd that nancial frictions on capital allocation at rm-level are coun-
tercyclical. Moreover, our empirical ndings suggest a key element for business prospects to
a¤ect capital reallocation - that is, the presence of nancial constraints. These, together with
the ndings of Basu and Fernald (2000), indicate the very channel described by our model
for resource allocation to a¤ect aggregate TFP uctuations over business cycles: variations
in nancial frictions, triggered by news shocks, lead to resource reallocation and, therefore,
aggregate TFP uctuations over the business cycles.
6.4 Frictions on New Capital Investment
Our model assumes away nancial frictions on investment. In reality, a relaxation of nancial
constraints might allow a rm to expand its production scale through an additional channel:
investing new capital. This channel has been viewed in the literature as the leading candidate
for nancial frictions to play a role in business cycles. In this subsection, we examine further
the empirical relevance of nancial frictions on new investment over business cycles.
36
To establish our empirical strategy, note that most business cycle studies that resort to
nancial frictions on new investment share a common feature: changes in the market prices
of assets a¤ect the degree of nancial frictions via borrowing producers net worth. Since
market prices of assets are largely driven by prospects on future investment protability, these
models bear similar implications that the arrival of good (bad) news about future protability
shall relax (tighten) nancial constraints. Accordingly, the presence of nancial constraints
magnies the impacts of news on new capital investment.55 If nancial frictions on investment
are empirically relevant, we should therefore observe a signicantly larger response of new
capital investment to business prospects about future protability for nancially constrained
rms than unconstrained ones. Hence, to test their empirical relevancy, we ask to what extent
the presence of nancial frictions a¤ects the impact of business prospects on investment, and
then compare the results with their counterparts in Table 9.
To make the comparison sharp, we follow exactly the same estimation strategy as before.
The impact of business prospects on investment is estimated across rms along di¤erent KZ
quintiles. The sample rms in each KZ quintile remain unchanged as those in the empirical
exercise on capital reallocation.56 We run the same panel regressions as (36). The only
exception is that the dependent variable now becomes investment, measured as expenditure
on new capital investment, CAPEXit (Compustat Annual Item 128), scaled by one-period-lag
book assets, AT it 1 (Item 6).
CAPEXit
AT it 1
= ai + at + b  LTGit + uit: (37)
Here ai and at are rm and year dummies, respectively.
Table 11 reports the estimation results. Compared with the estimated elasticity of capital
reallocation to business prospects in Table 10, we nd two key di¤erences in the patterns of
estimated b for new capital investment. First, the estimates of b for new capital investment
are highly signicant for all quintiles. By contrast, in Table 10, the estimates for capital
reallocation signicantly di¤er from zero only for the top three KZ quintiles, that is, rms
that are likely or denitely nancially constrained. Second, while the estimated b for capital
reallocation monotonically increases along KZ quintiles (Table 10), this pattern disappears
completely when the dependent variable changes to new capital investment (Table 11). In
fact, the estimates turn out to be rather stable across quintiles, ranging from the lowest of 0:12
55Note that even if nancial constraints are absent, news about future protability a¤ects the rst-best
investment level.
56We exclude those rm-year observations for which investment data are missing from our sample rms for
capital reallocation. This results in a sample size slightly smaller.
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to the highest of 0:17.57
Table 11: Business Prospects and Investment
KZ index b Obs. Adj. R2
Quintile 1 0:1218
(0:012)
6033 0:5645
2 0:1558
(0:013)
6027 0:5635
3 0:1305
(0:014)
6023 0:5540
4 0:1743
(0:016)
6036 0:6115
5 0:1588
(0:170)
6045 0:6379
Note:  and  stand for is signicant at 1% and 5%, respectively. Robust standard errors are
in parentheses.
It is not surprising that new capital investment reacts signicantly to LTG. As predicted
by the standard theory, higher future protability implies a larger rst-best capital stock in
the future and, therefore, more investment in the current period. Nevertheless, if nancial
frictions distort a rms production scale through new capital investment, we should expect to
see monotonically increasing estimates of b along KZ quintile in Table 11, as those in Table 9.
To the opposite, the estimates exhibit non-monotonicity and are rather stable across quintiles.
The very di¤erent patterns of estimated b in Table 9 and 11 help to distinguish the empirical
relevance of two channels through which nancial frictions a¤ect rmsproduction scale over
business cycles. In particular, we fail to nd evidence for nancial frictions to play a role
through new capital investment, despite its wide acknowledgement as one of the main channels
in the business cycle literature. This contrast greatly enhances the empirical plausibility of the
channel highlighted in the present paper: Financial frictions on capital reallocation serve as a
transmission mechanism for primitive shocks to a¤ect aggregate productive e¢ ciency.58
In summary, our empirical results strongly support the importance of variations in nan-
cial frictions on capital reallocation, rather than new capital investment, for individual rms
production scales. This, together with its countercyclicality, indicates that nancial frictions
on capital allocation is potentially important, and is empirically more plausible than nancial
frictions on new investment, as a transmission mechanism for primitive shocks to translate into
aggregate TFP uctuations.
57We also perform robustness check, following the same procedure as that in our previous exercise for capital
reallocation (Table 10). Our two key ndings remain unchanged. The results are available upon request.
58We conjecture that the di¤erent patterns of the estimated b between capital acquisition and new capital
investment might be due to the trade-o¤ between the time-to-build feature of new investment and the comple-
mentarity between new vintages of capital and new technology. We leave this issue for future research.
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7 Conclusion
This paper argues that nancial frictions on capital allocation, rather than on new capital
investment, are important as a transmission mechanism for primitive shocks to translate into
aggregate TFP uctuations. We show in a calibrated model that variations in nancial frictions
in response to news shocks can trigger sizable uctuations in aggregate TFP before the actual
technology change is realized. The TFP uctuations originating from capital reallocation,
furthermore, lead to business cycles by allowing positive comovement among current output,
consumption, investment, and hours worked. This positive comovement, as we demonstrate, is
di¢ cult to obtain when nancial frictions are imposed on new capital investment. Empirically,
we nd that the responses of capital acquisition to prospects about future protability are
signicantly larger for rms more likely to be nancially constrained, while such a pattern does
not exist for new capital investment. Capital acquisition of constrained rms, furthermore, is
found to be more procyclical than that for unconstrained ones. Therefore, both our theory
and empirical evidence support strongly the role of nancial frictions on capital allocation as
a transmission mechanism of TFP uctuations over U.S. business cycles.
Our work can be considered as a rst step towards understanding TFP uctuations over
business cycles. The model developed here, as a result, has abstracted from a number of
important issues. For example, in our model, entry and exit are exogenous. An endogenous
entry and exit decision à la Hopenhayn (1992) can be introduced to explore the importance of
nancial frictions for aggregate TFP via rm entry and exit. We conjecture that introducing
this extensive margin will amplify the response of aggregate TFP to primitive shocks such
as news shocks. A perhaps more important issue is that we abstract from individual rm
dynamics and how they interact with frictions on capital allocation.59 These abstractions also
make the model silent on which rms are nancially constrained. One can, instead, consider
a model with a long-term nancial contract to endogenize rm size distribution. It would be
interesting to see how the presence of a long-term contract a¤ects our results. Also, such a
framework may help to understand how primitive shocks are propagated over business cycles.
Aside from the implications for TFP uctuations, our model provides an alternative view
of how acquisitions are related to rm values, an issue that has been often addressed in the
nance literature (e.g., Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002, and Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). One
caveat is that rms in the present model are evaluated by the discounted sum of future prots.
An interesting extension of the model would be to allow for production-based asset pricing,
59Consequently, the nancial contract in our model is static.
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so that stock market valuations of rms and reallocations of capital interact over time. This
might eventually explain the puzzling joint behavior of aggregate TFP and stock prices found
by Beaudry and Portier (2006).
8 Appendix
8.1 Enforcement Constraint
The renegotiation process described here follows closely from Jermann and Quadrini (2006).
Assume that production of a type-h project at each period requires an amount of working
capital, denoted as ft = D
 
Kht

(or D
 
Kht ;H
h
t

in the full-blown economy); with D0 () > 0.
Working capital consists of liquid funds that are used at the beginning of time t and are
recovered at the end of time t; after all transactions have been completed: Because this is an
intra-period loan, the net interest payment is zero.
Entrepreneurs have the ability to divert working capital and default.60 Once the entrepre-
neur defaults, the lender can take over the control right of the project and recover a fraction
' of the future project value, denoted as V ht+1, which is the simply the present discount value
of the project prots from tomorrow on: Here, the underlying assumption is that only the
entrepreneur has the required talent to run this project e¢ ciently. Denote by ! the bargaining
power of the entrepreneur and by 1 ! the bargaining power of the lender. Bargaining is over
the repayment of the debt, denoted as bft. If they reach an agreement, the entrepreneur gets
ft   bft + V ht+1; and the lender gets bft, If there is no agreement, the entrepreneur gets ft and
the lender gets 'V it+1: Therefore, the net value for the entrepreneur to reach an agreement is
V ht+1   bft and the net value for lender is bft   'V ht+1: The bargaining problem solves:
maxbft

V ht+1   bft!  bft   'V ht+11 !
Taking the rst-order condition, we get bft = [1  ! (1  ')]V ht+1: Incentive compatibility
requires that the value of non-default for the entrepreneur, V ht+1; should be no less than the
value of default, which is ft   bft + V ht+1. Hence, we have
[1  ! (1  ')]V ht+1  ft
Denote [1  ! (1  ')] as : Then we get (1) (or (16) in the full-blown model).
60Similarly, Hart and Moore (1998) assume that beyond the project cost, a fraction of the loan that the debtor
receives from the creditor represents the non-recourse nancing, which is not seizable by the creditor.
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8.2 Denition of Recursive Competitive Equilibrium for the Full-blown
Economy
This section sketches out the denition of the recursive competitive equilibrium for our bench-
mark economy. To simplify notation, we abstract from population and denote lower-case vari-
ables as individual variables and upper-case variables as aggregate variables. In our benchmark
economy with news shocks on Zt, the state variables for the households are st =
 
Zt; 
Z
t ; kt;Kt

or simply (Zt; Zt+1; kt;Kt) since next-period aggregate technology is perfectly predictable by
(9) : Because entrepreneurs optimization problems at each period are static, we need only
specify the households problem recursively. The households problem can be rewritten as
v

Z;Z
0
; k;K

= max
c;i;h
n
u (c; h) + E
h
v

Z
0
; Z
00
; k
0
;K
0 j Z 0io
subject to
c+ i+ 

i
k
     n  gy
2
k =

r

Z;Z
0
;K

+ 

k + w

Z;Z
0
;K

h+ (1  )l + h:
k
0
= (1  ) k + i
K
0
= (1  )K + I  Z;Z 0;K
logZ
0
=  logZ + Z (38)
A recursive competitive equilibrium for this economy consists of a value function, v

Z;Z
0
; k;K

;
a set of decision rules c

Z;Z
0
; k;K

; i

Z;Z
0
; k;K

; h

Z; Z
0
; k;K

for the household; a cor-
responding set of aggregate per capita decision rules, C

Z;Z
0
;K

; I

Z;Z
0
;K

;H

Z;Z
0
;K

;
a set of decision rules for the entrepreneurs, Kh

Z;Z
0
;K

; Hh

Z;Z
0
;K

; K l

Z;Z
0
;K

;
H l

Z;Z
0
;K

and factor prices functions r

Z;Z
0
;K

; w

Z;Z
0
;K

; such that these func-
tions satisfy
1. The households problem (38) ;
2. The entrepreneursproblem (17) ;
3. The consistency of individual and aggregate decisions - that is, c

Z;Z
0
; k;K

= C

Z;Z
0
;K

;
i

Z;Z
0
; k;K

= I

Z;Z
0
;K

and h

Z;Z
0
; k;K

= H

Z;Z
0
;K

.
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4. The aggregate resource constraint
C

Z;Z
0
;K

+ I

Z;Z
0
;K

+ 
0@I

Z;Z
0
;K

K
     n  gy
1A2K = Y Z;Z 0 ;K
= Ah

Kh

Z;Z
0
;K
 
Hh

Z;Z
0
;K
1 
+(1  )Al

K l

Z;Z
0
;K
 
H l

Z;Z
0
;K
1 
;8

Z;Z
0
;K

:
8.3 Non-existence of NDBC with Frictions on New Capital Investment
In this section, we prove that there exist no news-driven business cycles in an environment with
frictions on new capital investment. Consider a two-sector economy in which the production
function for consumption goods and the production function for investment goods are distinct.
This economy di¤ers from the standard two-sector economy in that the investment good sector
is constrained. A social planner maximizes the expected utility of a representative household.
max
ct;ht;it
E0
" 1X
t=0
tu (ct; ht)
#
(39)
subject to
ct = G (kt; ht; it) (40)
kt+1 = (1  ) kt + it
it  Mt (41)
where
G (kt; ht; it) = max
kct ;k
i
t;h
c
t ;h
i
t
F c (kc; hc) (42)
subject to
F i
 
kit; h
i
t
  it
kct + k
i
t  kt
hct + h
i
t  ht
That is, we may solve the problem of optimal consumption and investment in a recursive way:
Given some it; which may be constrained by (41), we solve for the optimal consumption by
(42) : Then, given the optimal policy response of ct to it; we solve for the optimal it by (39) :
Note that in our specication of the nancial constraint on investment (41) ; Mt may
correspond to collateral value that is linked to future prot (e.g., stock value). This allows an
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expected increase in future TFP to increase Mt and, therefore, relax the constraint (41) : We
now prove that an increase in it caused by an increase in Mt must be associated with a decline
in ct and ht: To generalize, we assume that F c and F i are homogeneous of degree ; where
  1: Specically
F j

kjt ; h
j
t

=

kjt
 
hjt
1 
; j = c or i
We prove our claim following the strategy adopted by Beaudry and Portier (2007). Since
the production function is homogeneous, we can rewrite the problem (42) in its dual form
- i.e., cost minimization. Let 
c (rt; wt) represent the unit cost associated with one unit of
consumption good and 
i (rt; wt) be the unit cost associated with one unit of investment good.
Note that since the production function may be decreasing returns to scales, 
c (rt; wt) (and

i (rt; wt)) may depend on the amount of consumption goods (investment goods) produced.
To solve for 
c (rt; wt) and 
i (rt; wt) ; lets look at the general case
min
kt;ht
rtk
j
t + wth
j
t
subject to
F

kjt ; h
j
t

 yt; (43)
where j = c or i; yt can be ct or it: Solving for this problem, the rst-order conditions imply
wt
rt
=
kjt
hjt
1  

: (44)
Combining (43) and (44) ; we get
kjt = y
1

t

wt
(1  ) rt
1 
; (45)
hjt = y
1

t

(1  ) rt
wt

: (46)
The unit cost 
j (rt; wt) follows

j (rt; wt) =
rtk
j
t + wth
j
t
yt
=
rt

 wt
1  
1 
y
1

 1
t : (47)
Moreover, (45) implies that for ct,
kct = ct

c
1 (rt; wt) ;
where 
c1 (rt; wt) is the derivative of 

c (rt; wt) with respect to its rst argument. According
to (47) ;

c1 (rt; wt) = c
1

 1
t

wt
(1  ) rt
1 
: (48)
43
Similarly for it; we have
kit = it

i
1 (rt; wt) :
Therefore, the resource constraint for k becomes
ct

c
1 (rt; wt) + it

i
1 (rt; wt) = kt: (49)
Similarly, the resource constraint for h becomes
ct

c
2 (rt; wt) + it

i
2 (rt; wt) = ht: (50)
Finally, we use the rst-order conditions for consumption goods that rt = ct=kct and wt =
 (1  ) ct=hct . (47) establishes that

c (rt; wt) = : (51)
Note that when the production function is constant returns to scale ( = 1) ; the unit cost

c (rt; wt) = 1. Therefore, an equilibrium must satisfy (51) and the following rst-order
conditions:
 u2 (ct; ht) = wtu1 (ct; ht) : (52)
We now show that an increase in it due to a relaxation of constraint (41) must be associated
with a decrease in ct; ht or both. Lets assume the opposite - that is, both ct and ht increase.
Then, (52) implies that wt has to increase. Then, according to (51) ; rt has to decrease.
Together, this implies from (48) that 
c1 (rt; wt) shall increase. A similar argument implies that

i1 (rt; wt) shall increase. This violates resource constraint (49) : Hence, there is no positive
comovement between it and ct or ht in this two-sector economy.
8.4 Tables
Table A-1. Volatility of Macro Variables in the Economy w/o Labor
Data Model
Used for calibration
the standard deviation of TFP 0:0125 0.0124
Not used for calibration
the standard deviation of output 0:0173 0.0123
the standard deviation of consumption 0:0120 0.0058
the standard deviation of investment 0:0597 0.0393
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Table A-2. Cross-Correlation Table in the Full-Blown Model
t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2
Data
correlation(Y,Y) -0.0214 0.5565 1.0000 0.5527 -0.0463
correlation(C,Y) -0.1948 0.3038 0.7186 0.7153 0.4458
correlation(I,Y) 0.2357 0.6444 0.8540 0.1967 -0.4495
correlation(H,Y) 0.0316 0.5168 0.9343 0.5049 -0.1705
correlation(TFP,Y) 0.4162 0.6279 0.4099 -0.3638 -0.6303
News on Zt
correlation(Y,Y) 0.0918 0.5275 1.0000 0.5283 0.0901
correlation(C,Y) 0.0906 0.5466 0.9993 0.5349 0.1029
correlation(I,Y) 0.0938 0.4851 0.9966 0.5118 0.0629
correlation(H,Y) 0.0478 0.4437 0.9951 0.5524 0.1191
correlation(TFP,Y) 0.2021 0.6329 0.9799 0.4211 -0.0402
News on ht
correlation(Y,Y) 0.1239 0.6598 1.0000 0.6611 0.1268
correlation(C,Y) 0.1738 0.7473 0.9762 0.5386 0.0753
correlation(I,Y) -0.0051 0.3530 0.8765 0.8202 0.2263
correlation(H,Y) 0.1200 0.7332 0.8173 0.3591 0.1433
correlation(TFP,Y) 0.1732 0.6660 0.9920 0.6362 0.0529
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Figure 1: Response of Capital Reallocation to News Shock in Aggregate Technology in the 
Economy w/o Labor.  
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Figure 2: Response of Aggregate TFP and its Components to News Shock on Aggregate 
Technology in the Economy w/o Labor. 
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Figure 3: Percentage Deviations from the Steady State Value of Consumption, Investment and 
Aggregate Output in Response to News Shock on Aggregate Technology in the Economy w/o 
Labor. 
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Figure 4: Response of Capital Reallocation to News Shock on Aggregate Technology in the 
Full-Blown Economy.  
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Figure 5: Response of Aggregate TFP and its Components to News Shock on Aggregate 
Technology in the Full-Blown Economy. 
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Figure 6: Response of Adjusted Solow Residual and its Components to News Shock on Aggregate 
Technology in the Full-Blown Economy. 
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Figure 7: Percentage Deviations from the Steady State Value of Consumption, Investment, 
Aggregate Output and Labor Supply in Response to News Shock on Aggregate Technology in the 
Full-Blown Economy. 
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Figure 8: Capital Reallocation over the U.S. Business Cycles for Different KZ Quintiles. 
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